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CaseNo.20070673-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
State of Utah,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
vs.

Bradford Laine Salters,
Defendant/ Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from a sentence on convictions for unlawful possession of
controlled substances, third degree felonies; two counts of forgery, third degree
felonies; and obstruction of justice, a third degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction
under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2008).1
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Did the trial court fail to consider defendant's mental health and rehabilitative
needs in sentencing defendant to consecutive terms of imprisonment?
Standard of Review. This Court reviews sentencing decisions for abuse of
discretion. State v. Valdavinos, 2003 UT App 432,114,82 P.3d 1167. "An abuse of

1

Citation in this brief is to the current code, unless the version of the code in
effect at the time of the offense is relevant to the disposition of the case.

discretion results when the judge fails to consider all legally relevant factors, or if
the sentence imposed is clearly excessive/' Id. (additional quotation and citation
omitted).
STATUTE
The following statute is attached at Addendum A.UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-401(2) (West 2004).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE1
On April 25, 2005, defendant was charged with unlawful possession of a
controlled substance (cocaine), a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (West Supp. 2008), and unlawful possession of drug
paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5
(West Supp. 2005) 2522-R1-4.
On October 4, 2005, defendant was charged with unlawful possession of a
controlled substance (cocaine), a third degree felony, forgery, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (West Supp. 2008), and obstruction of justice, a class A
2

The case on appeal stems from charges in four separate cases in the district
court—case numbers 051902522; 051906908; 061903235; 061906976. Where
necessary, the record citation is preceded by the last four digits of the cited case.
The facts of defendant's offenses are unnecessary to the resolution of this
appeal.

2

misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-8-306 (West Supp. 2008). 6908Rl-3.
On April 10, 2006, defendant was charged with unlawful possession of a
controlled substance (cocaine), a third degree felony, obstruction of justice, a third
degree felony, unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a class B
misdemeanor, unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor,
driving on a suspended license, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 53-3-227 (West Supp. 2008), and failure to pay fees, a class C misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §41-la-1307 (West 2004). 3235-R13-16.
On October 20, 2006, defendant was charged with forgery, a third degree
felony, and obstruction of justice, a third degree felony. 6976-R1-3.
On June 22,2006, while his cases were proceeding, defendant sent a letter to
the court, requesting its help in having him released from jail to assist his family
with its financial difficulties. 2522-R69-70; 6908-R32-33; 3235-R40-41.3 In the letter,
defendant asserted that he had "suffered multiple seizures on May 6th and 7th
which made [him] suffer some brain damage and memory loss," rendering him
"unable to recall [his] family members," and requiring hospitalization. 2522-R69;
3

Early in the proceedings, without specific explanation in the record, Judge
Himonas began to hear all of defendant's cases at issue in this case.
3

6908-R32; 3235-R40. He also claimed that he was "suffering severe depression" and
that the mental health director told him that the Adult Detention Center (ADC)
could not treat him because he needed "intense therapy," which the ADC was
unequipped to provide. Id. Defendant further stated that he "needed to be put in to
Mental Health Court due to [his] memory loss." Id.
At a disposition hearing on July 14,2006, defense counsel confirmed the trial
court's understanding that the defense would petition for a competency evaluation,
reminding the court that defendant had experienced a series of seizures, that he had
been hospitalized, and that defendant "no longer has a lot of his long term
memory." R140:l-2. The court then ordered counsel to prepare the petition. Id. at 2
On October 27, 2006, defendant moved to continue proceedings so that he
could obtain his medical records in an attempt to be admitted to the Mental Health
Court. R140:4. Upon hearing of defendant's efforts, the court stated, "I think that
would be terrific," and continued proceedings for an additional thirty days for
defendant to obtain his records. Id. at 5.
On April 13, 2007, with the record silent as to defendant's competency
petition or the progress of his application to the Mental Health Court, defendant
pleaded guilty to three counts of possession of controlled substance, two counts of

4

forgery, and one count of obstruction of justice, all third degree felonies. R144:12.
The court dismissed all the remaining charges. Id. at 13.
In taking defendant's pleas, the court asked, "Do you suffer from any kind of
condition, physical, mental, or emotional, for which you're receiving treatment." Id.
at 6. Defendant answered, "Just depression," and, in response to the court's
inquiries, indicated that he was taking medication, which helped him to think more
clearly. Id. When counsel informed the court that defendant had just entered a
treatment program, the court responded, "Great." Id. at 7. The court then directed
defendant to have Adult Probation and Parole (AP&P) prepare a presentence
investigation report (PSI). Id. at 13. At the end of the proceeding, the court
repeatedly emphasized that it was crucial to defendant's interests that he
immediately—within one business day— make contact with AP&P and that if
defendant did not make sure the PSI was timely completed he would be "sentenced
to the max, which will be thirty years in prison." Id. at 14. After giving defendant
two days, instead of one day, to contact AP&P, the court reiterated the significance
of the PSI:
But I cannot emphasize enough for you, that you will be looking
at the max on each of these cases if you don't get a pre-sentence report
done, and I can virtually assure you that,- - that - - well, I'm not going
to say that, you - - it's to your benefit to get the pre-sentence report
done. I'm sure Mr, Delicino will pound that into your head
5

Id. Sentencing was set for June 1. Id. at 15.
On May25, 2007, the AP&P investigator to whom defendant was assigned
filed a "No Show Memo/' which stated that defendant had failed to contact AP&P
and that he had been booked into the Davis County Jail on April 28. 2252-R106. The
memo further stated that although defendant was released from jail on May 1, he
did not contact AP&P until May 16. Id.
The PSI recommended that defendant be sent "to the Utah State Prison for
consecutive terms." PSL2.4 Summarizing the investigator's evaluation, the PSI
noted that defendant had frustrated previously offered treatment, parole and
probation options, that he appeared to be a career criminal, and had no mitigating
qualities that suggested a period of probation is appropriate." Id.

The PSI included defendant's adult record, which covered almost five full
pages, listing 112 charges, apart from those in this case, charged on fifty-six
different dates from July 1982 to June 2007. Id. at 7-12. The PSI lists convictions for
twenty-five offenses, including attempted burglary, theft by deception, possession
of a stolen vehicle, forgery, and lewdness. Id. at 8-11. Twenty-nine other offenses
4

The details of the PSI are more fully set out in the argument portion of this

brief.
6

had xinknown or pending dispositions, Id. at 7-12. The investigator also noted that
defendant had "been booked into the ADC on 17 different occasions" since April 19,
,i IIft,a Dout me time defendant was arrested for the first of the series of offenses in
M^nros; hi ,il

7

The PSI also im on pohilcd ,i

IM» iiptLih1 null1 ivfillm hy ili'fnidLiiil s

supervising parole agent in January 2004, commenting on defendant's mental health
and treatment opportunities. PSI: 12-14, It noted defendant's numerous prior
paroles, his parole conditioned on his receiving mental health treatment to address
"cogn

•- restructuring and anger management/" his lax and deceptive attitude in

*••'••• <r TML:

- , • •.
?

wrote that defendant "has already

.v supervisor also
*'

^ nils'' nrnl lli.il

" [h]e has continued to use cocaine and marijuana, left our office without permission,
[committed] multiple curfew violations, failed to pay restitution, and [been]
continuous[ly] dishonest[] with our agency/' Id. at 13.
1 1 te AP&I : i i n estigatoi in this case further commented on defendant's mental
health .imi ttvattunit opinulunitirs; ( II) ddendaiil t I.iiinctl lo hau*
depressed and experienced some uriusin11 menf-il

IKMIIII

IVCLMIII\

been

proMoms, including-in.

unexplained amnesia (PSL15); (2) "[t]he courts have investigated the possibility of
[M]ental [H]ealth [C]ourt for the defendant and are awaiting an evaluation from
7

Valley Mental Health/7 however, defendant had not provided the evaluation to the
AP&P investigator (PSL12,16); (3) "[defendant].. . expressed displeasure that he
was not accepted in the Mental Health [C]ourt program, [but his] . . . motives are
questionable," since "[h]is efforts to seek a mental health diagnosis appear to be an
attempt to avoid his inevitable incarceration" (id. at 16); (4) "defendant has been
ordered to complete mental health and substance abuse evaluation numerous times
while in the community, [but] he has never been fully compliant with treatment"
(id.); (5) "defendant has done very little to curtail his substance abuse and obtain
treatment while awaiting sentencing (id), and (6) "[defendant's] attitude suggests
his need for treatment is the system's problem and he should be given a lighter
sentence due to his mental health state and chronic substance abuse" (id).
The PSI identified five aggravating circumstances: (1) established instances of
repetitive criminal conduct; (2) multiple charges or victims; (3) offender's attitude is
not conducive to supervision in a less restrictive setting; (4) offender continued
criminal activity subsequent to arrest; and (5) 25 years of criminal behavior. PSI at
Form 4:1. The PSI identified no mitigating circumstances. Id. at 2.
The court sentenced defendant to serve six consecutive zero-to-five-year
terms—a term of zero to thirty years—specifically indicating that it was "following
the recommendations" in the PSI, despite defense counsel's asserting that defendant
8

had applied to-some in-patient programs. R139il-4

\s ivnsun (or its decision 1 I e

court recited, almost verbatim, the five aggravating circumstances identified in
Form 4 of the PSI: "One, you have established repeated instances of criminal
conduct. I vvo, these cases involve multiple charges. Three, your attitude is not
supervision in a less restrictive setting, a: J u-a \ c continued your
M

\ •

l

engager .. _ « cars of

ongoing criminal behavior/' R139:4
mitigating circumstances. R139; PSI at Form 4:2.
Defendant timely appealed in each of his cases. 2522-R119; 6908-R80; 0235R96; 6976-R51. This Court consolidated the separate appeals. 6976-R-67.
" HIMMAR^ < W THE ARUUMKNT "
The record rebuts defendant's claim that neither the PSI investigator nor the
trial court considered his rehabilitative needs. The trial court heard throughout the
proceeding of defendant's menial lit-allli issues and ot his putative attempts to
obtain rehabilitative services both of \ * 1 del i it ei icoi iraged defer idai it to i esol v e.
Further, the PSI, which the court insisted defendant obtain for his own best interests
and which it obviously read, abundantly reflects that defendant had been presented
with treatment opportunities "numerous times" and that he had repeatedly
frustrated his supervisors in failing to take advantage of those opportunities. In
9

light of defendant's unusually lengthy criminal record, his on-going criminal
activity, and his refusal to take advantage of treatment opportunities or to respond
responsibly to supervision, the court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing
defendant to consecutive terms.

ARGUMENT
THE PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT ADDRESSED
DEFENDANTS MENTAL HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE
NEEDS, AND THE TRIAL COURT CONSIDERED THEM IN
SENTENCING DEFENDANT TO CONSECUTIVE TERMS
Defendant claims that neither the PSI investigator nor the trial court
considered his rehabilitative needs, and thus the trial court abused its discretion in
sentencing him to consecutive terms of imprisonment.5 Aplt. Br. at 7,11-16.
A. The trial court considered defendant's rehabilitative needs in
sentencing defendant to consecutive terms.
Trial courts have wide latitude in sentencing decisions. "A sentence will not
be overturned on appeal unless the trial court has abused its discretion, failed to
consider all legally relevant factors, or imposed a sentence that exceeds legally
prescribed limits/' State v. Perez, 2002 UT App 211, f 25,52 P.3d 451 (quoting State v.
Nuttall, 861 P.2d 454, 456 (Utah App. 1993). '"[T]he exercise of discretion in

5

Defendant, nevertheless, nowhere argues that the PSI was inaccurate.
10

sentencing necessarily reflects the personal judgment of the court and the appellate
court can properly find abuse only if it can be said that no reasonable [person]
\ iiiiilil lake the view adopted by the trial court.
.iltiTfttinri in ri^inui

Nuttall, 861 P.2d at 456 (second

ilinj' Hfufi <> i Hinntl, r>84 [' 2d ML), LS8/ (Utah 19/8)).

In . determining whether state offen s< • s „ 11 • • • I ' 1"i in

o i ii u r r i' n 11)' -' r

consecutively, the court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses,
the number of victims, and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the
defendant,

UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-401(2) (West 2004).

Defendant does not argue that the court did not consider the gravity and
i in umstamvsol lln tpffVriMj,x the ntinil'tri ul \ Ulims, in his history and character*
Rather, he only claims that beea/i ise tl Le PSI in \ est igator a i ml 1 h < • 1 r i a 11 (n j rt (. \ 111id I o
consider his mental health issues and his rehabilitative needs, the oni1 abused its
discretion in sentencing him to consecutive sentences. Aplt. Br. at 7,11-16.
" [ A]s a general rule, this court upholds the trial court even if it failed to make
Imdinj'/i un the

IOIORI

vvhonouT it wou Id be reasonable to assume that the court

acfnallv in.ido sun li 1 imtiiiif's

^lutc t1 I Ic/uis, JIHI1" I 11 I \ ]\ I 1, 40 I" ul bib (rejecting

challenge that the trial court did not consid< r .ill ihc -il^ilu1r>r\ s n i k n i iny,

LKICH'S

where, albeit without specifically mentioning the factors, the trial court stated 1 *
had carefully read a comprehensive PSI) (citations omitted).

t

State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649 (Utah App. 1997), anticipating the approach
taken in Helms, is dispositive of this case. Schweitzer pleaded guilty to stalking and
aggravated assault, stemming from his making death threats to his wife and his
stabbing a friend during a violent, drunken binge. Id. at 650-51. The trial court
sentenced Schweitzer to consecutive six-month and zero-to-five-year prison terms,
observing that he was "a clear and present danger" whose actions "cried out for
incarceration." Id. at 651-52. On appeal, Schweitzer claimed that the trial court
abused its discretion in sentencing him to consecutive terms without considering all
of the legally relevant factors, including that he could benefit from rehabilitation. Id.
This Court rejected that claim. It noted that the trial court heard of Schweitzer's past
substance abuse, which was "clearly related" to his criminal activity, his need for
rehabilitation, and his "fail[ure] to make an effort in his own rehabilitation,"
through witnesses7 testimony, counsel's arguments, and the PSI. Id. at 652.
Accordingly, the Court held that Schweitzer had not shown that the trial court failed
to consider the relevant factors. Id.
As in Schweitzer, and contrary to defendant's claim, the record, consisting of
defendant's remarks, his counsel's assertions, and the PSI, clearly indicates that the
trial court was well aware of defendant's mental health issues and how they
reflected on his rehabilitative needs:
12

Defendant's letter
• June 22, 2006 — Defendant asserts that he had recently suffered
multiple seizures, leading to brain damage and memory loss, and
requiring hospitalization (2522-R69; 6908-R32; 3235-R40); also informed
court that he was "suffering severe depression/7 requiring "intense
therapy," which the ADC was unequipped to provide (id.); "needed to
be put in to Mental Health Court" (id.)m,
Hearings
• July 14, 2006 - counsel reminds court of defendant's seizures,
hoipiMlization,
ffiiffior^
| n t e f ^ o n t o petition
for competency evaluation (R140:l-2);
• October 27, 2006 — defendant moved to continue proceedings to
obtain his medical records in an attempt to be admitted to the Mental
Health Court (R140:4);
• April 13, 2007 — at change of plea hearing, defendant reminds the
trial court that he suffers depression, for which he takes medication
that helps clear his mind (R144:6);
PSI-July 2007
• Defendant states that he is struggling with "mental health and
substance abuse" and that he wanted "a life other than being
depressed" (PSI:6);
• Defendant's parole supervisor states that defendant was granted
parole in 2004 offenses, conditioned on his receiving mental health
treatment to address "cognitive restructuring and anger management"
and on his obtaining a substance abuse evaluation with recommended
treatment (PSI: 13); expected that defendant would be excluded from
further mental health treatment at DRC after defendant had missed
several classes and after an arrest on new charges (id, at 14); indicated
that defendant had not PTOVIHPH any written documentation of

attendance for treatment of substance abuse at the University of Utah,
where he claimed he would be receiving treatment (id.);
• Defendant tells the AP&P investigator in this case that he has been
depressed and had recently experienced some unusual mental health
problems, including amnesia (PSL15); the investigator notes that (i) the
courts had investigated the possibility of [M]ental [HJealth [C]ourtfor
defendant and were awaiting an evaluation from Valley Mental Health
(id. at 12); (ii) defendant did not appear to genuinely seek entry to the
Mental Health [C]ourt program (id. at 16); (iii) defendant has been
ordered to complete mental health and substance abuse evaluation
numerous times while in the community, [but] had never been fully
compliant wilh treatment (zVf.)r(iv)"defendantKad done very HttTe to
curtail his substance abuse and obtain treatment while awaiting
sentencing (zd.),.and (v) defendant adopted an irresponsible attitude
regarding his mental health state and chronic substance abuse (id).
Based on defendant's lengthy criminal record refractory attitude, the
investigator also opined that defendant appeared to be a "career
criminal," . . . "incapable of living a crime[-]free lifestyle." Id. at 2
Sentencing
• July 20,2007 - Defense counsel informs the trial court that defendant
has been working to gain admission to some in-patient programs
(139:2).
In sum, over the long course of the proceedings, the trial court heard from
defendant and counsel about defendant's seizures, memory loss, hospitalization,
depression, and defendant's efforts to obtain a competency evaluation, admission to
the Mental Health Court, and treatment, all of which related to defendant's
rehabilitative needs.

14

-is iii Schweitzer, the PSI, too, addressed defendants rehabilitative needs,
recognizing that defendant was an incorrigible career criminal who had been
repeated,
rehab *"

unresponsive to treatment °ru *.
• »«;Js «is ,j miti<Mtin^ * :

/ thereby, repudiated his

: : M

The record also indicates lh.il Ihr It'tdU \ »u

K
,

id * oiisidii'txi the I SI even

though it did not expressly mention it in sentencing defendant

;

statutory mandate. Helms, 2002 UT 12,% 11. Specifically, the court signaled its
familiarity with the PSI report when, having heard that the State concurred "with
the recommendations'' of the PSI investigator, it readily responded, "!' n following
(1NI re':oni!iieiidtili(Mi^ " R1 V), V I he I'M reujnimended that" tl te Court commit the
defendant, Bradford Srilfprs In the I'l.ih SKHr rir.mi lin eoiisei utive ivnns
prescribed by law/'

PS1.2.

Thereafter, in imposing roiiseaitive terms »f

imprisonment, the court recited, almost verbatim, the aggravating circumstances
checked off by the PSI investigator on Form 4 of the Utah Sentencing Guidelines: (1)
cli.1! end a in I had "established instances of repetitive conduct"; (2) the cases involved
"nitillipk't iui^rs ' ( \] ddVn J nil's "VlliUklV ] vvas| in «1 muJuaw to supervision in a
less restrictive setting"; and (4) defend*] nl 'Von finned i rimiiuil .jeliviifv subsequent
to arrest/' Utah Sentencing Guidelines Form 4; R139:4-5 (transcript of sent 'end ng,
attached at Addendum B), Tracking the report, see PSL2 and Form 4, the court
"5

stated that an additional reason for imposing consecutive sentences was that
defendant had "engaged in 25 years on ongoing criminal behavior." See R69:5.
Moreover, in earlier proceedings, the trial court encouraged defendant to develop
his mental health record, with such expressions as "Great," and "I think that would
be terrific." R140:5; 144:7. The results from those evaluations would inevitably have
been included in the PSI, which the court repeatedly and adamantly insisted
defendant obtain for his own benefit. Given that the court had expressed such
interest in defendant's mental health status and so insisted that defendant obtain the
PSI, it would be unreasonable to conclude that the trial court had not read and
considered it for sentencing.
In short, both the PSI investigator and the trial court did address defendant's
rehabilitative needs, by properly recognizing that defendant himself had repeatedly
frustrated treatment options.
B. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing
consecutive sentences.
Defendant argues that if the trial court had considered his mental health and
drug abuse issues and his rehabilitative needs "it is reasonable to presume that the
trial court would have imposed concurrent sentences." Aplt. Br. at 15. Quite the
contrary, those "mitigating" factors, as defendant construes them, are so

16

outweighed by the aggravating factors in this case that no reasonable person would
dispute the court's sentencing decision.
. limself had effectively nullified the otherwise
mitigating effect of hi>

. ^;. -J rehahlikilive luvds b) his ongoing

refusal to follow through with treatment <\ ncl lo r * vip ils benefits, Aplo Mr nl l'Vlfi.
Further, the PSI documents defendant's constant refusal to comply with
supervision, to the repeated frustration of the authorities:
Show Memo" entered on May25, 2007— defendant fails to
contact AP&P after pleading guilty in this case (2252-R106);
• Defendant was given the opportunity to comply with community
supervision "a number of times/' but had "continued to victimize the
citizens of this community while being prosecuted for these current
offenses"; defendant stated that he felt remorseful for his criminal
conduct, "but his behavior indicates otherwise"; defendant had been
committing crimes "for the past 25 years," and he had "no significant
crime[-]free time in his adult life"; and defendant "has been given
treatment opportunities" during twenty years of crack cocaine abuse
"but [he] has very little unincarcerated drug[-]free time" (PSI:2);
• Defendant's parole supervisor in 2003 and 2004 noted that defendant
had committed "many violations" during "multiple parole
opportunities," opining that defendant would not be successful on
parole supervision" and that he "really should be returned to prison"
(PSI at 13-14) (capitalization in original);, the supervisor also wrote
that defendant had "continued to use cocaine and marijuana, left our
office without permission, [committed] multiple curfew violations,
failed to pay restitution, and [been] continuous[ly] dishonest[] with our
agency." Id. at 13.

17

Further, defendant's criminal history was extraordinarily long, confirming the
PSI investigator's opinion that defendant was an remorseless career criminal. That
record listed 112 charges relating to fifty-six separate incidents resulting in
convictions for at least twenty-five offenses committed through twenty-five years.
PSI: 7-12. And defendant had repeatedly engaged in criminal activity following his
arrest in this case. PSL2,11-12.
The trial court imposed consecutive sentences, resulting in an indeterminate
term of from zero to thirty years, reasonably recognizing, in accord with the PSI,
that there were numerous aggravating factors and no mitigating factors. R139:3-5.
That term of imprisonment distinguishes this case from those defendant relies on,
each of which held that lengthy minimum terms resulting from consecutive
sentences deprived the Board of Pardons of any flexibility to act in accord with the
defendants' progress towards rehabilitation. Aplt. Br. at 8-10. See State v. Galli, 967
P.2d 930, 938 (Utah 1998) (consecutive sentences aggregating to a minimum of
fifteen years where the trial courts "may have not have given weight to certain
mitigation circumstances"); State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236, 244-45 (Utah 1995)
(consecutive sentences aggregating to a minimum of sixty years); State v. Strurik, 846
P.2d 1297,1301-02 (Utah 1993) (consecutive sentences aggregating to a minimum of
twenty-four years excessive in absence of offender's extreme youth and absence of
18

prior violent crimjes). State v. Perez, is distinguishable on the trial court's almost total
.«. .o consider any of the statutorily required sentencing factors. 2002 UT App

In sum, MIL1 trial luml h.ninn1, ninskliTni nil ul llr -.Mlulnnly lequni'd
sentencing factors, including defendant's rehafcri 1 itnl: •

• •< .

no reasonable person would disagree with the court's decision to sentence
defendant to consecutive terms of imprisonment.6
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted September /z) , 2008.
MARKL. SHURTT^F*

V+<*h Attorney General

6

Defendant also claims that his trial counsel was ineffective failing to argue
for probation or concurrent prison terms, given his rehabilitative needs. Aplt. Br. at
13,15. In light of the discussion above, discussion of this claim is unnecessary. See
State v. Kelley, 2000 LT 41, % 26,1 P.3d 546 ("Failure to raise futile objections does
not constitute inefiective assistance of counsel/')
-o
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§76-3-401

§ 76-3-401.

CRIMINAL CODE

Concurrent or consecutive sentences—Limitations

Definil 1 : i i

(1) A court: shall determine, if a defendant lias been adjudged guilty of more
than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences
for the offenses. The court shall state on the record and shall indicate in the
order of judgment and commitment:
(a) if 'the sentences imposed are to run concurrently or consecutively to
each other; and
(b) if the sentences before the court are.to run concurrently or consecutive
ly with any other sentences the defendant is already serving.
iZl In d e t e n n i n ^
are to run concurrently or consecutively, the court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses, the
number of victims, and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the
defendant.
(3) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutivelj i£
the later offense is committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole,
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentencing
would be inappropriate.
(4) If a written order of commitment does not clearly state whether the
sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently, the Board of Pardons and
Parole shall request clarification from the court. Upon receipt of the request,
the court shall enter a clarified order of commitment stating whether the
sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently.
(5) A court, may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a
single criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401.
(6)(a) If a court, imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of
all sentences imposed .may not exceed 30 years imprisonment, except
provided under Subsection (6)(b)
(b) The limitation under Subsection (6)(a) does not apply if:
(i) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the death
penalty or a maximum, sentence of life imprisonment; or
(ii) the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on conduct
which occurs after his initial, sentence or sentences are imposed.
(7) The limitation, in Subsection (6)(a) applies if a defendant:
• (a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense;
(b) is sentenced ai differ cut omes for coe or ooze offenses, all of which
were committed prior to imposition of the defendant's initial sentence; or
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the
present sentencing court or by a court of another state or federal jurisdiction,
and the conduct giving rise to the present offense did not occur after his
initial sentencing by any other court.

(8) When the limitation of Subsection (6)(a) applies, determining the effect of
consecutive sentences and the manner in which they shall be served, the Board
of Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has been
committed for a single term that consists of the aggregate of the validly
imposed prison terms as follows:
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the
maximum sentence is considered to be 30 years; and
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum term, if
any, constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum terms.
(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurrently with the other or with a sentence presently being served, the term that
provides the longer remaining imprisonment constitutes the time to be served.
(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of
individual consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity of
any sentence so imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually
served under the commitments.
(11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to
impose consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases.
(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned" means sentenced and committed
to a secure correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1, the sentence has
not been terminated or voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of
where the person is located.
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-3-401; Laws 1974, c. 32, § 7; Laws 1989, c. 181, § 1; Laws
1994, c. 13, § 21; Laws 1995, c. 139, § 1, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1997, c. 283, § 1, eff.
May 5, 1997; Laws 1999, c. 275, § 1, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 2002, c. 129, § 1, eff. July
1, 2002.
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P R O C E E D I N G S

2

(Electronically recorded on July 20, 2007)

3
4

MR. DELICINO:
Mr. Salters.

5
6

THE COURT: All right.

9
10

Let's have Mr. Salters brought

up.

7
8

Your Honor, the last matter I have is

MS. MARTINEZ-GRIFFIN:

Andrea Martinez-Griffin for the

State.
THE COURT: Mr. Delicino, you may proceed.
MR. DELICINO:

Your Honor, I have reviewed the pre-

11

sentence report.

12

recommendation in the pre-sentence report.

13

I've also talked to Mr. Salters about the

Mr. Salters would like to inform the Court that he

14

has been working on trying to get in some in-patient programs

15

for the past few weeks.

16

because he was incarcerated at one point when he was trying

17

to set up appointments with the social services coordinator

18

of Legal Defender's Office.

19

an appointment; made that appointment this week to see about

20

what programs he could get into, and then set up basically an

21

evaluation date. At that last meeting essentially they informed

22

him that they would screen him.

23

He's had some difficulty doing so

He was able last week to set up

You know, I apologize for the delay.

We've had some

24

difficulty coordinating dates.

25

periodically incarcerated it's been difficult to coordinate with

Because Mr. Salters has been

-(jl

Defender1' 3 Oiiice and then social services department there

" *r what programs mi ght be avai1ab 1 e to Mr. S a11ers.
I be 1 i e v e I ir
regarding

S a J 1: e r s wo u 1 d 1 i ke t o a ddr ess t h e Co 12r t

(inaudible) h i s s e n t e n c e .
':

Mr.

Salters?

-

SALTERS:

h^ve —
p,

Your Hone .

. ,:e to get in a program if possible to give me some
- ^r-e. - reatir.ent •
I11

:*

>i 1 ,

P, 1 3 1: i ght.

I s t here anything else,

Salters?
••

2RS: N •

THE COURT:

Any 1 egal reason of. which you are aware why

I should not proceed to / niilcnr* „ Mi
MR, DELICINO;
THE C O U R T :

T >*j I ii inu:'

Not at t h i s t i m e , y o u r H o n o r .

W i t h r e s p e c t , t h e n , t o t h e c h a r g e c: >f tl .e

0 0 s s e s s i o n o r u s e o f a c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e -- y o u w a n t t o speak

0

make it clear that the State adamantly concurs with the

1

r e c oiriine n d a t :i o 1 1 s .

2

THE COURT:

3

MS.MART?""

4
5

~"

following the recommendations,

cr,—:-••

clear,
THE COURT:

what's that?

,

I

so

-41

MS. MARTINEZ-GRIFFIN:

I just wanted to make that clear

2

on the record that the State concurs with that recommendation.

3

THE COURT: All right. With respect to the charge of

4

the possession or use of a controlled substance, a third degree

5

felony, I'm sentencing you to zero to five at the state prison.

6

That's in the matter ending 2522.

7

In the matter ending 908 in the charge of possession

8

or use of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, I'm

9

sentencing you to zero to five at the state prison.

Second

10

count, the forge —

11

third degree felony, I'm sentencing you to zero to five at the

12

state prison.

13

or the count of forgery in that matter, a

In the matter ending 235, the charge of possession or

14

use of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, zero to

15

five at the state prison.

16

In the matter ending 97 6, the charge of forgery, a third

17

degree felony, zero to five at the state prison.

18

ending 976, obstruction of justice, a third degree felony, zero

19

to five at the state prison. All will run consecutive to one

20

another.

21

Utah State Prison.

22

In the matter

I'm imposing the sentence of zero to 30 years at the

The reason for running them consecutive is as follows.

23

One, you have established repeated instances of criminal conduct.

24

Two, these cases involve multiple charges.

25

is not conducive to supervision in a less restrictive setting,

Three, your attitude

-5 ^
" :a continued your criminal actiT? '»"' : ::i lbject 1: ::: e i

j:.d
-•

,f

ion, vou have engaged in 25 yes.b .i ongoing criminal

behavior.

Ii'h * re to take it to an end, Mr. Salters.

Y M I ti.nv

tipped I .

MR'. DELICINO:

Thank you, your Honor.

matters, if 1 may hij excuse*:!,
THE COURT:

You may,

(Hearing concluded)

That concludes my

f I i y I I • (\u r »j i» y:ur Honor?
I'm

>»>rry, Mr, Delicino.

